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Industrial control systems (ICS) are a major part of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure. The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21) Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors, all of which utilize 
ICS technologies [1]. These systems operate our country’s critical infrastructure—
electrical power grid system, power plants, gas, water system, transportation system, food 
and agriculture, etc. These industrial control systems are vital to the United States: 
interruption or destruction of these systems and their assets may have a crippling effect to 
our national security, the safety of our citizens, and our economic security [1]. Although 
ICS technologies have evolved in complexity and functionality, in parallel with other IT 
technologies, the ICS protocols and platforms were not originally designed with security 
in mind. As ICS technologies became networked with other systems, including the 
Internet, vulnerabilities in those control systems became exposed to new and greater 
threats, leading to increased concern for protecting these (previously isolated) vulnerable, 
legacy systems. 
As ICS assets and peripherals became exposed to new threats, ‘bolt on’ security 
solutions—such as firewalls, encrypted access points, passwords, and anti-virus 
software—have begun to be employed in the ICS domain, in the absence of ‘built-in’ 
security. One study has attempted to illustrate the wide spread weaknesses of how 
contemporary ICS implement these solutions and how they are susceptible to 
compromise via the Internet. Project Shodan Intelligence Extraction (SHINE)—led by 
Bob Radvanovsky and Jake Brodsky in coordination with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) ICS Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)—conducted a 
study surveying vulnerable Internet-facing ICS [2]. Project SHINE used Shodan, a search 
engine created by John Matherly, to locate systems accessible from the Internet by using 
meta-data stored in service banners [3]. It searches the Internet for banners advertising 
services such as HTTP, SMTP, Telnet, and FTP. The team found 7,200 IP addresses that 
were related to control systems, out of about 500,000 suspected IP addresses [2]. The 
study found over 20,000 devices with weak, default or non-existent logon credentials [2].  
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Increased public awareness of ICS vulnerabilities has led to new research 
studying ICS devices and controllers, including research in vulnerabilities affecting the 
(relatively obscure, vendor-specific) protocols used in that domain. Security researchers 
have developed proof-of-concept exploits and penetration-testing tools, to help system 
owners understand the vulnerabilities in control systems. Other tools have been 
developed to augment or extend the functionality of traditional defensive tools. There is, 
however, no central location for all ICS-related tools; they are scattered across the 
Internet. In this work, we survey publicly available defensive and pen-testing tools for the 
ICS domain. 
A. RESEARCH 
We examine publicly available defensive and adversarial ICS-related tools, to 
create a consolidated list based on relevance to the ICS domain. We characterize each 
tool based on purpose, availability, and the ICS sector to which it appears most relevant. 
We select a small number of tools in our survey to study in the context of an 
experimental SCADA test environment. We describe the design and implementation of 
this environment, and our experience with evaluating each tool. The hands-on evaluation 
of each tool focuses on three goals: to verify the tool’s availability, to investigate if the 
tool works as described, and to confirm the existence of appropriate documentation 
sufficient to install and use the tool. We discuss the public release of the Moki Linux 
distribution, a custom ICS tool distribution that is based on the popular Kali Linux 
distribution. 
B. DOD APPLICABILITY 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest owners of real estate, 
buildings, and ICSs in the federal government. The DOD has more than 500 installations, 
300,000 buildings, 250,000 linear structures and an estimated 2.5 million unique ICSs 
[4]. ICS are heavily relied upon within the DOD, including the U.S. Navy. The seaborne 
component of ICS includes both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard shipboard 
machinery control systems (MCS). The day-to-day operations of a fully functional, 
uninterrupted MCS are necessary to accomplish the U.S. Navy’s primary mission of 
 3 
defending the nation by deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. The 
security of ICS and MCS is not only critical for accomplishing the mission, but also in 
ensuring the safety of the men and women of the military operating these control 
systems. An attack impacting the availability or integrity of a control system may 
jeopardize the life or limb of the personnel operating the equipment that a control system 
controls. The preponderance of relatively obscure commercial ICS protocols makes this 
domain difficult to study, without the use of authentic equipment in a laboratory 
environment. Understanding the current state of ICS-related tools may greatly improve 
the ability of DOD security professionals to study control systems and to improve the 
security of our nation’s critical infrastructure. Information technology (IT) professionals 
and software developers can utilize the Moki Linux distribution in support of the 
development, operation, and defense of control systems in military installations and 
vessels. 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
 Chapter I introduces the research question, motivation of our research, and 
its relevance in the DOD.  
 Chapter II provides an overview of industrial control systems and 
introduces the Tofino SCADA Security Simulator. 
 Chapter II discusses the methodology used in this study. 
 Chapter IV illustrates the analysis and comparison of surveyed ICS-related 
tools. 
 Chapter V details the tools selected from the survey for evaluation in the 
SCADA test environment. 
 Chapter VI discusses the motivation to build the Moki Linux distribution. 








Industrial Control Systems is an umbrella term that encompasses a broad category 
of control systems in industrial facilities and critical infrastructures, including the 
Defense Industrial Base sector. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) are among the varying kinds of ICS and 
ICS components as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) [5]. Conversely, SCADA have become a universal term for the definition of ICS. 
This chapter aims to introduce and define terms and concepts that are used throughout 
this paper. 
A. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 
There are several applications of the various categories of ICS. SCADA systems 
are typically used in highly distributed systems where assets are in geographically 
separate locations [5]. Examples of these systems include, but not limited to oil and gas 
pipelines, electrical power grid systems, water distribution systems, and rail 
transportation systems [5]. A SCADA system enables supervisors and operators to be 
centrally located at a monitoring facility where all components of a large-scale system 
that is distributed throughout a large geographic area can be monitored, controlled, and 
maintained. These actions are made possible by using field control devices that are 
remotely controlled to monitor and manage sensors and actuators, and handle alarms 
(e.g., open or close valves or breakers).  
Another category of ICS is Distributed Control Systems (DCS). DCS are similar 
to SCADA but on a smaller scale. They are not typically dependent upon large-scale 
network infrastructure to connect to a remote site. NIST defines DCS as “a control 
architecture containing a supervisory level of control overseeing multiple, integrated sub-
systems that are responsible for controlling the details of a localized process” [5]. 




manufacturing systems, and critical infrastructure such as electric power plants, water, 
and sewage treatment facilities, most of which also exist on most military bases 
nationwide.  
An ICS implementation that is more applicable to the United States Navy and the 
United States Coast Guard is the machinery control systems, which are a shipboard 
SCADA that operate in a similar function as its shore-based counterpart except in a 
smaller, enclosed environment. MCS onboard naval vessels connect its propulsion, 
electrical, damage control, and other various systems to a human-machine interface 
(HMI) system allowing ship operators to monitor system and device status [6]. This 
enables shipboard watch stander to monitor the ship’s machinery operation from a central 
location, typically the Damage Control Central. Some key control components of an ICS 
discussed in this project are described below. 
1. Programmable Logic Controller 
A programmable logic controller (PLC) is an industrial computer designed to 
control machinery by controlling logic as simple as opening and closing valves on a 
pipeline system to programming and controlling a series of robotic arms in an automobile 
manufacturing plant. PLCs perform logic functions programmed by engineers to control 
electrical hardware such as relays, switches, mechanical timers/counter, as well as 
provide feedback from sensors back to the operators [5]. Modern PLC technology have 
been modernized to process more complex logic processes [5].   
2. Human-Machine Interface 
Human-machine interface is composed of computer software and hardware, 
which allows human operators to supervise and control processes of an industrial control 
system. From an HMI station, operators have the ability to modify control systems 
settings or manually override the automatic operation of the system in case of emergency 
[5]. HMI has the capability to log events to a data logger where an operator can display 
reports such as system health, historical trends, and system faults that may be reviewed 
for troubleshooting or forensic analysis in case of an intrusion or anomalous behavior.  
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B. SUPERVISORY AND CONTROL LAYER 
The network architecture of an ICS can be viewed two different ways from a 
logical organization standpoint. NIST describes the ICS network architecture in three 
separate logical layers: control network, corporate/supervisory network, and enterprise 
network [5]. The American National Standards Institute defines its SCADA reference 
model with five levels (Level 0–Level 4) [7]. For the purpose of this thesis, we will use 
the NIST definition of ICS network architecture. The enterprise layer is outside of the 
scope of this thesis and will not be discussed in detail. The corporate/supervisory and 
control layers are described below. 
1. Corporate/Supervisory Layer 
The corporate layer is a logical layer in an ICS whose main function includes 
managing workflows to produce the desired end products. Some corporate layer activities 
include: collecting data from the production plant, data logging, and hosting application 
servers. 
The boundary between the corporate layer and the control layer is physically 
separated by a stateful firewall to provide separation between control systems traffic and 
regular corporate layer traffic (i.e., HTTP, SMTP) [5].  
2. Control Layer 
The control layer is a logical layer in an ICS where HMIs and PLCs reside. It is 
the lowest layer in an ICS as defined by the NIST SP800-82 [5]. HMIs are found in the 
control layer where physical processes are monitored and controlled. Each HMI receives 
process directives and instructions from to the corporate layer such as logic rules and 
updates to program instructions. The types of field controllers that operate in this layer 
include PLCs, DCS controllers, and remote terminal units (RTU) [5]. 
C. COMMON PROTOCOLS AND STANDARDS 
Before industrial control systems became interconnected with other systems, ICS 
device manufacturers developed their own proprietary protocols for communicating 
 8 
among PLCs, remote terminal unit (RTU), sensors, actuators, etc. As a result, there are a 
multitude of industrial control protocols used today. The following are selected industrial 
control protocols that we used and interacted with in this project: Modbus/TCP, DNP3, 
and common industrial protocol (CIP) & EtherNet/IP (ENIP). Each is described below. 
1. Modbus/TCP 
Modbus/TCP is an application-layer messaging protocol for client-server 
communications between devices connected on different types of buses or networks [8]. 
Modbus/TCP is an application layer protocol that operates above the lower four layers of 
the TCP/IP communication stack, depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Modbus TCP/IP Communication Stack, from [9] 
Modbus/TCP follows a master-slave architecture where a master sends a request 
to a slave and waits for a response. A Modbus/TCP data packet contains a layered set of 
data. The application data unit (ADU) is embedded in the TCP data array (Figure 2). 
When data is transmitted over the network, it continues down the stack and is 
encapsulated by the next lower layer [9].  
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Figure 2.  Construction of a Modbus/TCP Data Packet, from [9] 
Within the Modbus/TCP, an ADU (Figure 3) contains the Unit ID and Function 
Code, both of which will be explored in detail throughout the project. The Unit ID field is 
used to identify a remote server location on a non-TCP/IP network.  
 
Figure 3.  Modbus/TCP Application Data Unit (ADU), from [9] 
Each Modbus/TCP function code defines the master’s requested action. Figure 4 
lists some examples of Modbus/TCP function codes. 
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Figure 4.  Modbus/TCP Function Codes, from [9] 
The Modbus protocol’s data model contains four primary data tables (see Figure 
5). Discrete Input is a single-bit, read-only data type that can be provided by an I/O 
system. Coils are single-bit, read and write data type that is alterable by an application 
program. The Input Register is a 16-bit word, read-only data type that can be provided by 
an I/O system, and the Holding Register is a 16-bit word, read and write data type that is 
alterable by an application program [8]. 
 
Figure 5.  Modbus Data Model, from [8] 
2. DNP3 
The distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) is a master/slave control 
system protocol primarily used in utilities such as electric and water companies in 
Northern America [10], [11]. DNP3 was specifically designed to facilitate 
communication between SCADA control equipment. Similar to most industrial control 
protocols, DNP3 started as a serial protocol and was redesigned to work over IP via TCP 
or UDP encapsulation. DNP3 protocol stack is illustrated in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.  DNP3 Protocol Stack, from [11] 
DNP3 is a client/server protocol stack or outstation/master respectively, where the 
latter is what is typically used in DNP3 terminology. A master is typically an HMI PLC 
device. An outstation consists of PLC, RTU, or Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) that 
communicates with sensors and actuators [11]. 
3. Common Industrial Protocol and EtherNet/IP  
Common industrial protocol (CIP) provides users unified communication 
architecture throughout the manufacturing enterprise. It provides the interoperability and 
interchangeability that is essential to open networks and open systems [12]. 
EtherNet/IP (ENIP) follows the OSI model. It implements CIP at the Session 
layer and above and adapts CIP to the specific EtherNet/IP technology at the Transport 
layer and below (see Figure 7) [13]. It provides users with the network tools to deploy 
standard Ethernet technology for manufacturing applications while enabling Internet and 
enterprise connectivity [12]. 
Messaging over EtherNet/IP takes place within the application layer of CIP and 
the data exchange between nodes is transparent to users. Commonly used for I/O 
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messages, these make full use of the producer/consumer model and are commonly used 
for scheduled communication between controllers [14]. There are four types of CIP 
messaging: polled, change of state, cyclic, and strobed. In polled messaging, a master 
sequentially queries all of the slave devices in the network by sending output data and 
receiving input data as a response. Strobed messaging is similar to polled but sends a 
single multicast request data and receives sequential response of data from slave devices 
with no further acknowledgement messages required from the master. Cyclic messaging 
is a message sent by a device on a pre-determined schedule basis. Change of state 
messaging is similar to cyclic, but rather than a timed event, the message from the device 
is sent in response to an event that caused the data to change [14].  
 
Figure 7.  EtherNet/IP Protocol Stack, from [14] 
D. TOFINO SCADA SECURITY SIMULATOR 
Tofino SCADA Security Simulator is a complete SCADA system in a portable 
package designed by Tofino Security for security research and training. The simulator is 
designed for easy presentation of SCADA control systems and security concepts by 
highlighting the risks faced by SCADA and ICS from computer worms, malwares, and 
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hackers [15]. This “SCADA in a box” system (depicted in Figure 8) includes: an industry 
standard PLC (Wago 750-841), a simulated process system with a demo panel, the 
Tofino Security Appliance, an HMI, and the Tofino Central Management Platform 
(CMP); the latter two are pre-installed and configured on a laptop. Also included in the 
laptop is a SCADA worm hidden in a PDF that when opened, runs a malicious code that 
exploits the PLC and affect SCADA system operations. It demonstrates how SCADA 
systems may behave when attacked, and how to utilize the Tofino Security Appliance to 
inhibit such attacks [15].  
 
Figure 8.  Tofino SCADA Security Simulator, from [16] 
1. Tofino Security Appliance 
One of the main components of the Tofino SCADA Security Simulator is the 
Tofino Security Appliance, depicted in Figure 9. It is an ICS firewall designed for use in 
industrial control equipment and networks. This component is an in-line “bump in the 
wire” device and is tailored for industrial systems ensuring high availability between 
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HMIs and PLCs. The Tofino Security Appliance performs stateful packet filtering at the 
ICS application level. For example, the Modbus Enforcer (described below) is configured 
to allow only Modbus read commands from the HMI workstation. This ensures that 
unauthorized write commands to the PLC from the HMI workstation fail [16]. Another 
example of Tofino Security Appliance’s application-level stateful packet filtering is its 
inspection of the Modbus protocol in search for malformed packets that may be used to 
perform buffer overflow attacks on the PLC. This “bump in the wire” firewall operates 
seamlessly within the network and does not impact the process when installed [16]. 
The Tofino Security Appliance secures industrial control networks using loadable 
security modules (LSM). LSMs are firmware modules that are downloaded to the Tofino 
Security Appliance with security features for each location in an ICS control network. 
There are currently five LSM modules available for the Tofino Security Appliance [17]. 
The simulator includes three LSM licenses: firewall, Modbus/TCP enforcer, and secure 
asset management. The two LSM modules available but not included in the Tofino 
SCADA Security Simulator are the object linking and embedding (OLE) for process 
control (OPC) enforcer and the virtual private network (VPN) module. Each LSM 
licensed for the Tofino Security Appliance is described below.  
a. Firewall LSM 
The Firewall LSM acts as a typical firewall for industrial networks. It is preloaded 
with rules, which can be modified with additional rules that specify which devices are 
authorized to communicate, and with which protocols those devices are authorized to 
communicate. Similar to a home or business firewall, any traffic that does not match the 
specified rules are blocked, logged, and reported as a security alert [16].  
b. Modbus/TCP Enforcer LSM 
The Modbus/TCP Enforcer is a feature that conducts deep-packet inspection on 
the Modbus/TCP protocol. Preloaded rules, which can be modified and appended with 
additional rules, specify which Modbus Function Codes and register/coil addresses may 
be accessed. Any traffic that does not match the specified rules are blocked, logged, and 
reported as a security alert [16]. 
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c. Secure Asset Management LSM 
Secure asset management is a feature that tracks all devices that communicate 
through the Tofino Security Appliance. It uses Tofino’s passive asset discovery service to 
locate devices in the network and does not scan or probe the network as those activities 
could lead to unintentional denial of service and cause controllers to fail [16]. After 
discovery, devices can be dragged into a graphical network model that creates a logical 
organization of the entire network architecture in the CMP. Having a visual 
representation of the network architecture in the CMP improves the quality and accuracy 
when firewall rules are created. 
 








In this chapter, we discuss our approach for characterizing the space of 
adversarial and defensive tools available for the ICS domain (i.e., by conducting a survey 
of all publicly available tools) and experimentally evaluating select tools identified by the 
survey. 
A. APPROACH 
The goal of our project is to survey and assess publicly available tools applicable 
to the ICS domain. Our focus is on SCADA-specific tools that may be employed to 
defend or test resources specific to the ICS domain (e.g., programmable controllers and 
network traffic involving industrial protocols). We attempt to characterize each tool 
based on its popularity among security tool distributions developed for use by 
professionals working in the ICS domain. In general, the tools included in the survey are 
created by well-known ICS research and consulting firms such as Digital Bond, whose 
main focus is control system security. Digital Bond develops tools that help asset owners 
and vendors assess the security of their control systems and detect and stop cyber attacks 
[18]. Other groups and institutions specializing in control systems security with 
contributions in the creation of penetration testing tools in the ICS domain are within the 
purview of this survey. Following our ICS survey, we select a small number of tools for 
secondary, in-depth experimentation. The goal of this hands-on evaluation is to assess the 
state of the tool. In particular, is it available (or vapor-ware)? Does it work as described? 
Does it have appropriate documentation to guide installation and use? The tools are 
evaluated in a small test environment built for our study, described in detail in Chapter V.  
There are a number of tools that are generally useful and beneficial to securing the 
ICS domain. These tools include scanners, simulators, and fingerprinting tools that 
facilitate the initial stages of attack, helping security professionals and penetration testers 
to identify services in an ICS environment that may be vulnerable. Other tools target 
common Enterprise protocols and software, such as Telnet and Network Dynamic Data 
Exchange (NetDDE). These non SCADA-specific tools can be used to establish a 
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foothold in industrial control environments to launch exploits or to pivot to other systems 
in the network. Also included are also SCADA-specific tools for defense and penetration 
testing, including ICS-specific protocol scanners and vendor-specific exploits, such as 
those employed by Stuxnet to target an existing DLL vulnerability for the Siemens 
SIMATIC STEP 7 [19]. We discuss the scope of the tools we survey, next. 
B. SCOPE 
The scope of the survey is limited to tools relevant to the ICS domain. Generic 
tools (Snort, Wireshark, Tenable Nessus scanner) that are useful generally and may be 
employed in the ICS domain are not included in our survey; however, we do survey ICS-
specific plugins or extensions that may enhance these. We restrict ourselves to those tools 
we can access (e.g., available via websites of research groups and consulting firms or via 
publicly available repositories such as github.com and code.google.com). Proprietary 
tools that are not available for public use are not in scope of this project. We note that 
tools publicly available at the time of the survey may become unavailable; for example, 
among the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), some participating 
institutions are seeking to license their technologies to private sector companies [20]. The 
platforms for these tools will not affect the scope of the survey. Most organizations 
operating industrial automation and control systems have moved away from proprietary 
operating systems, which use individual, isolated computers, towards employing 
interconnected commercial-off-the-shelf operating systems. This reduces overall support 
costs and permits remote operation and administration among other significant business 
benefits [5], [7]. Additionally, our survey considers the ICS domain to which each tool 
appears applicable, including, but not limited to: electricity transmission and distribution, 
gas and water distribution networks, oil and gas production operations, gas and liquid 
transmission pipelines as well as engineering, propulsion, and auxiliary systems on board 
United States Navy and Coast Guard ships [7]. 
From a SCADA network organization perspective, the focus of our work is 
directed towards assets in the control network or between the control and corporate 
networks, as defined in NIST SP 800-82 [5] or Level 2 and below on a reference model 
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defined by the American National Standards Institute) [7]. All assets and protocols 
associated with the control network layer are pertinent to our tools survey. Tools related 
to assets and protocols outside the control network (i.e., the SCADA corporate layer) are 
not included in our survey. 
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IV. SURVEY SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we survey publicly available defensive and adversarial tools 
available for the ICS domain. We analyze and compare two primary penetration-testing 
distributions, various ICS-related Metasploit modules and ICS tools not associated with 
any specific distribution. 
A. TOOLS DISTRIBUTION  
The two ICS-related distributions surveyed here are the Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL) Kali Linux distribution and the SamuraiSTFU (Security Testing 
Framework for Utility) distribution.  
1. INL Kali Linux 
Idaho National Laboratory participates in a national research initiative to improve 
the security and resilience of our nation’s energy-sector critical infrastructure through the 
National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) program. The NSTB is a collaborative Department 
of Energy (DOE) initiative for securing SCADA and energy-related control devices [21]. 
The test bed is designed to help partners and vendors assess system hardware and 
software. In addition, it provides infrastructure for testing and validating control systems, 
to support training and research for improving the national critical infrastructure [22]. For 
example, the NSTB program offers an introductory SCADA security course, intermediate 
SCADA security course, and advanced SCADA security red/blue team course. The INL 
Kali Linux distribution was developed for use in this courseware, to support trainees by 
offering hands-on experience with tools relevant to energy-sector protocols and systems 
so students may observe exploits and learn mitigations.   
2. SamuraiSTFU 
SamuraiSTFU is a distribution created to support an ICS security-training course, 
offered by the SANS Institute and available at various conventions like Black Hat and 
BruCON. Similar to INL’s custom Kali distribution, SamuraiSTFU is an open-source 
Ubuntu Linux distribution for penetration testing energy sector control systems and 
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related critical infrastructure. The distribution is geared towards hands-on penetration 
testing for embedded electronic field devices, network protocols, and RF communications 
associated with ICS and smart grid systems [23]. 
3. Tools Distribution Comparison 
A consolidated list of tools from each distribution is shown in Table 1. This 
matrix is organized in three sections: penetration testing tools with SCADA 
enhancements, SCADA-specific tools, and tools relevant to the energy sector. Metasploit 
and ModScan are tools in both INL Kali Linux and SamuraiSTFU, discussed in detail in 
Chapter V. 
a. Penetration-Testing Core Tools 
In the penetration-testing core tools section, we have highlighted those tools that 
are not SCADA-specific but have SCADA-relevant enhancements or plugins. These 
include both pen-testing tools (Metasploit) and defensive tools (Snort, Baryard2, 
Suricata). 
Metasploit is penetration-testing software designed to verify vulnerabilities and 
manage security assessment by using tools and exploits in the form of modules. These 
modules are the result of a collaboration of over 200,000 open source community 
developers [24]. Metasploit is intended to allow security professionals to find weak 
points in their systems before a malicious attacker does [24]. Metasploit currently has 
over 2,600 exploits in its Metasploit Framework database. Of these, 49 ICS-specific 
exploits are available via the Metasploit Framework Update. 
Snort is an open source intrusion prevention system (IPS), capable of performing 
real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks [25]. Snort’s features include 
protocol analysis and content searching/matching. Snort can detect a variety of attacks 
and network probes, such as buffer overflows, port scans and OS-fingerprinting [25]. 
Digital Bond has developed several Snort rules expanding the tool’s capabilities to handle 
popular ICS protocols. Barnyard2 allows Snort to write efficiently to disk without 
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interruptions from network traffic monitoring. Suricata is an open source next generation 
intrusion detection and prevention system similar to Snort. 
b. SCADA-specific Tools 
The SCADA-specific tools are those specifically designed to exploit components 
in the ICS domain, but may not be specialized to any sector of ICS usage. These tools 
primarily deal with the Modbus/TCP and DNP3 protocols, which are used in several ICS 
sectors. These tools include scanners, fuzzers, and simulators. ModbusPal and 
OpenDNP3 are simulators for the Modbus/TCP protocol and DNP3 protocol, 
respectively.  
c. Energy Sector Tools 
The energy sector tools are those uniquely applicable to devices and components 
in the energy sector. These tools include radio frequency and logic analyzers, phasor 
simulators, and fuzzing tools for electric smart meters (e.g., GNU Radio, iPDC, PMU 
Simulator, Saleae Logic, and Termineter). These tools enhance the vulnerability 
identification and security assessment of energy sector control systems, and may be used 
in conjunction with the tools from the SCADA-specific category.  
Table 1.   ICS Tools Distribution Survey. 
 




Barnyard2 x   SecurixLive Cross-platform 
Metasploit x x Open Source  / Rapid7 Cross-platform 
Snort x   Sourcefire Cross-platform 









  x 
Adam Crain and Chris 
Sistrunk 
Cross-platform 
MBclient   x Loic Lefebvre Cross-platform 
Mbtget   x Loic Lefebvre Cross-platform 
ModbusPal   x 
Multiple Developers 
(Open Source Project) 
Cross-platform 
Modscan x x Mark Bristow Cross-platform 
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Tool/Exploit Name INL Kali SamuraiSTFU Developer System(s) 




GNU Radio   x 
Eric Blossom / GNU 
Project 
Cross-platform 
iPDC (Phasor Data 
Concentrator) 
  x 
Nitesh Pandit & Kedar 
Khandeparkar 
Unix / Unix-like OS 
PMU Simulator   x 
Nitesh Pandit & Kedar 
Khandeparkar 
Unix / Unix-like OS 
Saleae Logic   x Saleae Cross-platform 
Termineter   x Spencer McIntyre Cross-platform 
 
B. TOOLS SUMMARY 
We surveyed a total of 39 ICS-related, publicly available tools for defensive and 
adversarial purposes (see Table 2). These tools range in functionality from scanning tools 
that automate known exploits against ICS-related software. The summary includes tools 
not found in any known distribution. Research groups and independent researchers 
developed many of these tools to demonstrate exploits against various control systems 
devices and components. These range from hardware/vendor-specific vulnerabilities to 
ICS vulnerabilities relevant to multiple implementations.  
1. Commercial Tools 
All tools surveyed are freely available online to use with the exception of two: 
Nessus and Saleae Logic Analyzer. The ICS-specific software or plugins for these tools 
are free, but require either a subscription or commercial hardware to operate. We describe 
these next. 
a. Nessus 
Nessus is a vulnerability, configuration, and compliance scanner for a wide 
variety of systems. It supports ICS networks using a set of plugins developed by Digital 
Bond for Nessus. Nessus offers a one-week trial period but requires an annual 
subscription, ranging from $1,500–$5,000 per year [26]. 
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b. Saleae Logic Analyzer 
Saleae Logic Analyzer software is used to record, view, and measure digital 
signals. The software is free, but requires commercial hardware to operate. The Saleae 
hardware is sold from $99–$499, depending on its features [27].  
2. Tools Platform 
Most tools in Table 2 are designed to operate across all platforms or have releases 
for multiple platforms. The cross-platform tools are implemented in, for example, Python 
Perl, Java, and the NMAP scripting language; any system that supports these would have 
the ability to run those tools. Most exploits are hardware- or vendor-specific exploits, 
such as s7_password_hashes_extractor.py, which is specifically developed to exploit 
Siemens products running the S7 communications protocol. Conversely, there are other 
tools that work across multiple hardware and vendor devices such as the codesys-shell.py, 
which is an exploit for the CoDeSys software present on several PLCs and other control 
devices. 
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Table 2.   ICS Tools Survey. 







Vulnerability scanner that 
offers many features to 
help assess the security of 
control system networks, 





Saleae Logic Analyzer x Saleae 
Cross-
platform 
Logic analyzer used to 
record, view, and measure 
digital signals.  
https://www.saleae.com/Logic 





DNP3 Fuzzing tool that 








Discovers and enumerates 
BACNet Devices collects 










Command-shell utility - 
allows an unauthenticated 












File Transfer Tool - 
allows for reading and 
writing files on 













NMAP NSE - script that 
will detect if PLC or 
controller is running a 
vulnerable version of 











Command Line - Python 
script that provides an 
interactive command-line 
to the D20′s tftp backdoor 
command line. Same 




d20tftpbo   Digital Bond General 
Electric 
D20 ME 
D20 TFTP Buffer 
Overflow Tool  - crashes 
the D20 tftp service, all 
processes are stopped and 








on EtherNet/IP devices 
including Vendor ID, 
Device Type, Product 
name, Serial Number, 
Product code, Revision 









Development toolkit for 
software defined radios 











protocol tool: send/recv 
identify packets and 
extract vendor name, 
model name, revision 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 
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protocol tool: send/recv 
identify packets and 
extract vendor name, 









Attempts to check 
tcp/2404 port supporting 
IEC 60870-5-104 ICS 
protocol. 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 
iPDC (Phasor Data Concentrator) 
  











JtR S7 Password Cracking   ScadaStrangeLove Cross-
platform 
Script that would take and 
crack the hashes found 




Kismet   Mike Kershaw Cross-
platform 
Open source wireless 
network detector and 










used to interconnect 
industrial PLC (and a lot 
of other things). This 
module gives you access 
to TCP and RTU version 
of this protocol, through 







Perl based Modbus 
scanner that creates 
Modbus transactions from 









Attempts to check 
tcp/102 port supporting 
iec-61850-8-1 (mms) ICS 
protocol. Send identify 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 
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Tool/Exploit Name Commercial Developer System(s) Description  URL 
request and extract 
vendor name, model 










Modbus slave simulator. 
Interface with the 
capabilities to reproduce 








Tool designed to map a 
SCADA MODBUS TCP 
based network 
https://code.google.com/p/modscan/ 
NetDDE Share Tool   Neutralbit Cross-
platform 
A NetDDE client that can 
compromise a system 





OpenDNP3  Automatak Cross-
platform 
DNP3 protocol simulator https://github.com/automatak/dnp3 
PLCScan  ScadaStrangeLove Cross-
platform 
Python script that checks 
the availability of two 
ports, TCP/102 and 
TCP/502,  if it discovers 
either of these two ports 
open, it will call other 











Phasor Measurement Unit 











Profinet discovery tool. 
Send multicast ethernet 
packet and receive all 
answers. Extract useful 
info about devices: PLC, 
HMI, Workstations. No 
scapy required. Works on 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 
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Scans subnet and find 
profinet-enabled devices 
(PLC, HMI), PC 
workstations. Extract 










Profinet SET request 










Set network info: IP, 
mask, gateway through 
Profinet DCP request 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 





Snort rules set for the 










S7 offline password 
bruteforce based on 
challenge-response data, 











extractor from Siemens 











bruteforce based on 
challenge-response data,  
extracted from auth traffic 
dump file for Siemens 
S7-1500 PLC’s. 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 
s7-enumerate.nse   Digital Bond Cross-
platform 
Enumerates Siemens S7 
PLC Devices and collects 
their device information. 
https://github.com/digitalbond/Redpoint 
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S7 Packet Structure - 
shows packets with 










S7 Show Payload - shows 
packet payload 
https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools 
telnet-fp.py   Digital Bond Cross-
platform 
Generic telnet 
fingerprinting tool - may 
be used against any 
controller, which supports 








Tool for enumerating and 
fuzzing C12.18 and 




C. METASPLOIT FRAMEWORK ICS MODULES 
The Metasploit Framework contains modules for scanning, enumerating, and 
exploiting vulnerable ICS components and field devices. Table 3 shows ICS-related 
modules available through MSFUpdate. MSFUpdate is a command that downloads 
Metasploit module updates from an online repository. In particular, these tools are 
downloaded in Kali Linux by updating the Metasploit Framework through the apt-get 
update && apt-get dist-upgrade command. All but three modules in Table 3 are available 
through MSFUpdate. These three modules were developed by Security researcher Dillon 
Beresford to exploit the Siemens Simatic S7 platform [28]. The core of Table 3 was 
developed from a list of SCADA-specific Metasploit modules from SCADAhacker.com 
[29]. This original list was updated and expanded based on further research to form the 
survey appearing here. 
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exploit/windows/fileformat/bacnet_csv
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scadapro_cmdexe.rb x Measuresoft ScadaPro 
exploit/windows/scada/scadapro_cmde
xe.rb 
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Next, we describe our test environment and our experience with running some of 
these tools.  
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V. TOOLS EVALUATION 
In this chapter, we explore the ICS tools selected from the survey, experimenting 
with each tool using a small test environment built for our study. Some of the aspects we 
explore include: the availability of the tool, its installation process, and its conformity to 
the developer’s description.  
A. TEST ENVIRONMENT 
A small-scale SCADA test environment was built for our study. The environment 
simulates a small distributed SCADA system, following guidance from NIST SP800-82, 
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security and ANSI/ISA-99.00.01-2007, 
Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems Part 1: Terminology, Concepts, 
and Models [5], [7]. These two documents define terminology and provide an 
architectural model for a typical ICS environment. The test environment adopts the NIST 
SP800-82 organization and terminology—dividing the environment between the Control 
Network, Corporate/Supervisory Network, and Enterprise/Outside World Network [5], as 
opposed to the five-layer model of ANSI/ISA-99 [7]. Our test environment utilizes real 
and virtual components to simulate an entire enterprise network. The physical 
components of the test environment leverage two Tofino SCADA Security Simulators. 
Each kit consists of a Wago PLC controlling a simulated compressor system, a demo 
sensor panel, an HMI that interfaces with the PLC, and Tofino Security Appliance 
product. The default configuration of the Tofino Security Appliance product is passive 
mode during the testing and evaluating the tools selected below. Operating the Tofino 
Security Appliance in passive mode allows the tools to run in the network without 
interference from the firewall. Connecting the two Tofino kits creates a realistic, 
distributed Enterprise-scale ICS network, where each kit acts as a remote site within a 
small-scale Enterprise Network. 
Another experimental SCADA security test environment—built by Ti Safe, a 
supplier of products and quality services for information and automation security based 
out of Rio de Janeiro—follows a similar approach to ours. Their environment leverages 
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the Tofino kit for their project’s test network design architecture (Figure 10). They 
provide specific solutions for automation network security based on the ANSI/ISA-99 
standard with the main objective of security and protection of Critical Infrastructure [30], 
[31]. Our SCADA test environment follows the architecture from Ti Safe’s SCADA 
Security Testbed. 
 
Figure 10.  Ti Safe SCADA Security Testbed Network Diagram, from [30] 
1. Test Environment Design 
We designed our SCADA test environment following the organization of different 
ICS layers defined in NIST SP800-82 and the physical design concept of Ti Safe’s test 
bed (see Figure 10) [5]. 
a. Organization 
Our project’s SCADA test environment is organized into three main parts. In 
accordance with NIST SP800-82, a typical ICS network organization is comprised of a 
control network at its lowest level, a corporate or supervisory network at the middle level 
that directly interfaces with the Control Network, and an Enterprise Network [5]. At the 
Enterprise layer, multiple Corporate and Control Networks may exist, depending on the 
size and physical location of the entire ICS network. Our test environment is too small to 
warrant the complexity of the five levels described in the ANSI/ISA-99 SCADA 
reference model (i.e., they are unnecessary to describe the components and objectives 
that this project attempts to achieve).  
 39 
b. Environment Topology 
Our test network (Figure 11) consists of two Tofino demonstration kits, to 
simulate two of the three networks that make up the fictional “Fort Sask” Enterprise 
Network—a fictional pipeline system defined in the Tofino Security Appliance Central 
Management Program (CMP) demo configuration. The network topology diagram 
distinguishes between two types of components. Green network lines and peripherals 
represent real network connections and devices that physically exist in the test 
environment. Blue network lines and peripherals represent fictional network connections 
and devices, which are notionally part of the network architecture and more accurately 
represent a real, distributed industrial control network.  
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Figure 11.  Test Environment Network Diagram 
The Fort Sask Control Network is located at the fictional Fort Sask Main 
Headquarters. This consists of a Wago PLC that controls pumps and actuators of a 
compressor system in a gas pipeline system, simulated by LED lights on a circuit board 
depicted (see Figure 12). The Tofino Security Appliance (an ICS firewall) is connected as 
a “bump-in-the-wire” between the Wago PLC and a network hub. The HMI, CMP, 
Security Onion, and Kali Linux machines are all connected to the hub. The Security 
Onion and Kali Linux machines are platforms for troubleshooting, monitoring, and 
launching defensive and adversarial tools in our test network. 
The Sumas Pump Station Network is a remote site, fictionally connected via 
microwave radio tower or cellular tower. This setup reflects a typical remote site for an 
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Network portion of the Sumas Pump Station is implemented using the second Tofino kit. 
It contains the same setup as the Fort Sask Control Network, described above.  
The Jasper Pipeline Network is a notional third network segment, consisting 
entirely of fictional components. It is located at a separate remote site and contains a 
Corporate/Supervisory Network connected to the Enterprise Network via fiber optic cable 
line. This configuration follows an example in NIST SP800-82 on how typical Industrial 
Control Systems Enterprise Network are connected [5].  
 
Figure 12.  Tofino SCADA Simulator Representing Fort Sask Control Network 
2. Test Environment Implementation 
The implementation of the test environment is relatively straightforward, with 
minor, manageable complications stemming from hard-coded settings associated with the  
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PLC and HMI in the Tofino kits, and license restrictions limiting our ability to fully 
customize the network setup of the two Tofino kits. Figure 13 represents the final setup 
of the fully functional SCADA test environment. 
For each Tofino demonstration kit setup, we created a Virtual Machine (VM) 
copy of the laptop accompanying the kits. We needed to create two different copies of the 
provided operating system and configure them to have distinct IP addresses (.15 and .20 
respectively, as depicted in Figure 11, above) in order for the HMI and CMP to 
successfully communicate with the PLC.  
The installation of Kali Linux and Security Onion was straightforward, requiring 
minimal setup and updates. The Security Onion distribution of Linux is configured in 
promiscuous mode, for testing defensive tools such as Snort and for monitoring and 
troubleshooting, throughout the network setup process. Kali Linux is setup for use as an 
attack launch point for adversarial tools, simulating an attacker who has already gained a 
foothold inside the Enterprise Network.  
Due to hard-coded IP address ranges used in the HMI and CMP (192.168.1.0/24), 
we were unable to change the address space for either Tofino demonstration kits. We use 
two Vyatta routers, one on each Control Network in front of the hub, and employ 
Network Address Translation (NAT) to provide each remote site—the Fort Sask and 
Sumas Pump Station—with private, distinct address spaces. The two routers are 
connected together using a switch that simulates a WAN connection. Two hubs 
connected to the switch provide visibility to packets traversing through the Enterprise 
Network, allowing us to accurately observe the tools we run from the perspective of both 
networks and to monitor network activity in all segments of the network. 
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Figure 13.  SCADA Test Environment 
B. DIGITAL BOND’S QUICKDRAW SCADA SNORT RULES 
Digital Bond developed SCADA Intrusion Detection System (IDS) signatures for 
various industrial control protocols including Modbus/TCP, DNP3, and EtherNet/IP. 
These rules are written in Snort syntax and are designed to identify signatures of 
unauthorized requests, malformed protocol requests and responses, dangerous 
commands, and network behavior that may indicate possible attacks [32]. Digital Bond’s 
IDS Snort signatures were developed under contract from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA). 
HSRPA is a branch of DHS’ Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate [32]. 
1. SCADA IDS Signatures 
Digital Bond’s Quickdraw SCADA IDS is released as a compressed zip file 
available on its website, including all available Snort signatures and accompanying 
preprocessors. Next, we describe installing these rules under the Security Onion 
distribution of Linux. Security Onion already provides network security monitoring tools 
such as Snort and Snorby, a utility that enhances the usability and presentation of 
information under Snort. Digital Bond’s Quickdraw preprocessors and plugins for Snort 
were designed for Snort versions 2.8.5.2 and 2.8.5.3. The version of Snort provided by 
Security Onion is newer (version 2.9.5.6). One advantage of using Security Onion for 




declared in its custom Snort rules are already included in the Snort configuration file. A 
user need only define the variable and the link to the rules file in order to use Snort with 
the Quickdraw rules. 
a. Installation 
The download and configuration process for Digital Bond’s Quickdraw SCADA 
IDS rules is a simple, straightforward process. All rules are available for download as a 
zip file from Digital Bond’s website. The following are the download and configuration 
procedures for the Digital Bond’s Quickdraw SCADA IDS rules: 
(1) Download the zip file from the digital bond website (see Figure 14). The --
no-check-certificate option ignores the default check of server’s certificate 
against available certificate authorities, to avoid interoperability issues 
with the SSL verification between various sites and user machines.  
 
Figure 14.  Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules wget command 
(2) Unzip the downloaded file (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15.  Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules unzip command 
(3) Copy each individual rules file into the snort rules folder. For a typical 
Snort installation in a Linux system, the Snort rules folder is located at 
/etc/snort/rules (see Figure 16). For the Security Onion Linux distribution, 
the Snort rules folder is located at /etc/nsm/rules (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 16.  Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules copy to Snort rules folder 
 
Figure 17.  Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules copy to Snort rules folder (Security 
Onion) 
(4) Add the path of the Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules files to the snort.conf 
file (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18.  Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules snort.conf rules path 
(5) Add required variables from the Modbus/TCP, EtherNet/IP, DNP3, and 
vulnerabilities signatures (see Figure 19). The default IP address is the 
$HOME_NET where Security Onion is configured to monitor.  
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Figure 19.  Digital Bond Snort IDS Rules snort.conf variables 
b. Modbus/TCP Signatures 
The Modbus/TCP rules file contains 14 Snort IDS rules configured to detect 
anomalous behavior between the Modbus client and the Modbus server.  
c. EtherNet/IP Signatures 
The EtherNet/IP rules file contains 16 Snort IDS rules configured to detect 
anomalous behavior between the EtherNet/IP client and the EtherNet/IP server. Unlike 
the Modbus/TCP rules, the EtherNet/IP rules require preprocessors. Preprocessors are 
required for the EtherNet/IP protocol to ensure reliable rules and avoid false positives and 
false negatives.  
d. DNP3 Signatures 
The DNP3 rules file contains 13 Snort IDS rules configured to detect anomalous 
behavior among the DNP3 client, DNP3 server, and any IP address communicating or 
attempting to communicate with the DNP3 client and server. The original 13 Snort IDS 
rules are susceptible to intentional fragmentation and long message fragmentation that 
circumvents the Snort IDS rules. With the addition of a DNP3 preprocessor, the non-
preprocessor rules were modified for the preprocessors as well as three additional rules.  
e. Vulnerabilities Signatures 
The Vulnerabilities Rules file contains rules that are vendor-specific, as opposed 
to the protocol-specific Snort signatures described earlier. The Vulnerabilities Rules file 
includes 17 rules from vendors such as CitectSCADA, WonderWare, RealWin, 
VxWorks, and BroadWin. There are also several rules that are donated to/and in 
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collaboration with Digital Bond. This set of rules include: 61 rules donated by Emerging 
Threats Pro with assistance from Nitro Security, five rules developed by Nitro Security in 
partnership with Rockwell Automation in response to ICSA-11-273-03 Rockwell 
RSLogix Overflow Vulnerability [33], and six rules donated by Rockwell Automation in 
response to vulnerabilities identified by Project Basecamp. 
2. Sample Packet Capture Files 
Digital Bond provides traffic samples for testing and evaluation. This sample 
includes: 16 individual EtherNet/IP protocol traffic samples (with description of what 
each sample tests), two Modbus/TCP and two DNP3 protocols traffic samples. Figure 20 
illustrates the command to download the traffic samples from Digital Bond’s website 
[32]. 
 
Figure 20.  Digital Bond’s Quickdraw Traffic Sample wget command 
The samples designed to test the Modbus/TCP rules ran successfully on the 
Security Onion. Figure 21 illustrates the tcpreplay command used to replay one of the 
Modbus traffic samples provided by Digital Bond. The -t option performs the replay of 
traffic at top speed and the -i eth0 option identifies the interface where the traffic sample 
is run, in this case it is replayed on the eth0 interface.  
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Figure 21.  Replaying Modbus/TCP traffic samples using tcpreplay in top speed 
The Snorby program packaged in the Security Onion distribution, depicted in 
Figure 22, shows alerts triggered by the rules as the traffic samples were run on the 
network using tcpreplay. The Snorby dashboard organizes the alerts by severity level: 
high, medium, and low severities based on priority levels defined in the Snort rules (see 
Figure 23), with priority 1 being highest severity and priority 3 being lowest severity.  
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Figure 22.  Snorby User Interface 
 
Figure 23.  Sample Modbus/TCP Snort rule 
The Snorby program is accessible via the localhost webserver on port 444. A 
shortcut icon is also available on Security Onion by default (see Figure 24).  
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Figure 24.  Snorby Desktop Shortcut Icon 
We ran the traffic samples in real-time mode and top speed mode. Figure 25 
illustrates one of the traffic samples run at real-time speed, where 118 packets are sent 
through the wire in 1541 seconds. The Snort identification results are the same when 
running the traffic samples at top speed. We observed that, although the samples 
triggered some Modbus/TCP rules, they did not trigger all the rules. These traffic samples 
may be designed to test some, but not all of the rules. Digital Bond does not specify what 
the Modbus/TCP traffic samples are designed to test and trigger.  
 
Figure 25.  Replaying Modbus/TCP traffic samples using tcpreplay in real-time 
The Squert Dashboard (see Figure 26), a tool similar to Snorby packaged within 
Security Onion for visualizing Snort alerts, shows the Modbus/TCP Snort rules that were 
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triggered after running the Modbus/TCP traffic samples provided by Digital Bond. Most 
(10 of the 14) Modbus/TCP rules and one rule from the Vulnerabilities signatures were 
triggered (see Figure 26). The triggered rule from the Vulnerabilities signatures is SID: 
1111617 (see Figure 27), which is a heap-based buffer overflow in Automated Solutions 
Modbus/TCP master OPC Server that allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service 
and possibly execute arbitrary code [34]. 
 
Figure 26.  Squert Dashboard 
 
Figure 27.  Snort rule SID:1111617 
We ran all traffic samples provided by Digital Bond: 16 EtherNet/IP protocol 
traffic samples, two DNP3 protocols traffic samples and the two Modbus/TCP protocol 
traffic samples. No EtherNet/IP or DNP3 related Snort rules were triggered during the 
tests.  
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EtherNet/IP and DNP3 rules require preprocessors based on our analysis and 
testing of the rules set. The patch provided by Digital Bond failed to install correctly and 
none of the rules became active. Therefore, all rules for EtherNet/IP and DNP3 are 
currently broken for Snort version 2.8.5.3 and older. The configuration of Snort under 
Security Onion is different from a typical Snort installation: the configuration files are 
reorganized into a Network Security Monitoring folder. The preprocessor and plugin 
patch created by Digital Bond is designed for Snort versions 2.8.5.2 and 2.8.5.3. The 
patch contains multiple hard-coded addresses that do not carry over to the later version of 
Snort. Figure 28 illustrates the command for executing the Snort preprocessor patch.  
 
Figure 28.  Quickdraw Snort Preprocessor Patch command 
As depicted in Figure 29, the Snort preprocessor patch looks for a missing file 
whose path is hard-coded, but is either not present or has changed locations in newer 
versions of Snort. 
 
Figure 29.  Quickdraw Snort Preprocessor Patch  error 
Snort fails to compile when executed without a successful installation of the 
Digital Bond’s preprocessors and with the EtherNet/IP and DNP3 rules configured in the 
snort.conf file. The DNP3 rules file contains a variable, dnp3_cmd_fc that is used by the 
preprocessor and not defined in the snort.conf file (see Figure 30). 
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Figure 30.  Missing dnp3_cmd_fc variable in DNP3 rules 
Similarly, one of the variables of the EtherNet/IP rules file used by the 
preprocessor and not defined in the snort.conf file is cip_service (see Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31.  Missing cip_service variable in EtherNet/IP rules 
Due to differences in configuration and version, the installation of the Quickdraw 
processors and plugins were unsuccessful. We were unable to find resources discussing 
the installation of Digital Bond’s Quickdraw SCADA preprocessors on later versions of 
Snort. Likely, the preprocessors need to be updated to accommodate newer Snort 
versions. We commented out the rules in the DNP3 rules file that required preprocessors 
in order for Snort to successfully load the rules file and start networks scans.  
C. MODBUS METASPLOIT TOOLS 
Metasploit is a console of modules for developing and executing adversarial tools 
such as scanning and exploit tools. The Metasploit Framework contains several modules 
for exploiting ICS applications and hardware components. There are three auxiliary 
modules designed for scanning and enumerating the Modbus/TCP protocol, independent 
of the brand of PLC. All three Modbus/TCP Metasploit modules were tested and 
evaluated in our test environment using a Wago PLC running the Modbus/TCP protocol. 
Next, we describe the behavior of each of these modules under the following test 
condition: the HMI is active, monitoring PLC activity and generating traffic; the Tofino 
Security Appliance is set to its default passive mode; the Kali Linux node is running 
Metasploit; and the Security Onion node is running the tcpdump utility to capture packets 
between the Kali node and the PLC, (i.e., to verify that the right function codes are sent 
to the PLC and to analyze the PLC’s response to the Metasploit module scans). 
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1. modbus_findunitid 
The modbus_findunit Metasploit module is a scanner that enumerates Modbus 
Unit ID and Station ID. This module sends a command with Function Code 0x04 (Read 
Input Register) to the Modbus endpoint. If the Modbus endpoint contains the correct 
Modbus Unit ID, it returns a packet with the same Function ID. If not, it would add 0x80 
to the Function Code to yield 0x84. This is interpreted as the Exception Code 
“incorrect/none data from stationID,” because it did not respond correctly to the Read 
Input Register Function Code [35]. The code 0x80 indicates a Modbus exception 
response. In a normal response, the Modbus server returns the function code of the 
request; in an exception response, the function code’s most-significant bit (MSB) is set 
from 0 to 1. This adds an additional 0x80 to the original function code, which has a value 
of lower than 0x80. The additional 0x80 in the function code alerts the client to recognize 
the exception response and examine the data field for the specific exception code [8]. 
From the Kali Linux station of the Test Environment, we ran the Metasploit 
Console and loaded the modbus_findunitid module. The target address was set to the 
Wago PLC’s IP address, 192.168.1.1. Other options for the module, depicted in Figure 
32, include: target port (default Modbus port 502), timeout for the network probe, range 
of Modbus Unit ID to scan (default is aggressive mode scan from 1 to 254).  
 
Figure 32.  modbus_findunitid Metasploit module options 
We started the scan and the PLC returned unit IDs from 1 to 254. The Wago PLC 
returned all 254 unit IDs as valid. Upon further investigation, we discovered that the use 
of unit IDs is a legacy feature of the Modbus protocol. The Modbus unit IDs became 
outdated when Modbus was encapsulated in the TCP protocol. The unit ID is ignored and 
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Modbus slave units are now identified by their IP address [36]. This makes searching for 
a specific unit ID ineffective. Any live Modbus slave units will respond to any requested 
Modbus unit ID. 
2. modbusclient 
The modbusclient Metasploit module allows reading and writing data to a PLC 
using the Modbus/TCP protocol. The original modbusclient module created by 
EsMnemon was a write-only module utilizing the protocol’s Function Code 0x06 (Write 
Single Register). Arnaud Soullie modified the code to include the following Function 
Codes: 0x01 (Read Coil), 0x03 (Read Holding Register), and 0x05 (Write Single Coil) 
[37].  
a. Function Code 0x01 (Read Coil) 
A successful execution of modbusclient using Function Code 0x01 allows the 
users to read the status from 1–2000 contiguous coils in a remote PLC device. The 
DATA_ADDRESS field, depicted in Figure 33 specifies a 2-byte starting address for the 
returned coil status (0x0000 to 0xFFFF). The response from the Modbus server is the coil 
status, one bit per coil represented in the data field [8]. 
b. Function Code 0x03 (Read Holding Register) 
A successful execution of modbusclient using Function Code 0x03 allows the 
users to read the status from 1–2000 contiguous discrete inputs in a remote PLC device. 
The DATA_ADDRESS field, depicted in Figure 33, specifies a 2-byte starting address 
for the returned register status (0x0000 to 0xFFFF). The response from the Modbus 
server is the register value in the response message, two bytes per register [8]. 
c. Function Code 0x05 (Write Single Coil) 
A successful execution of modbusclient using Function Code 0x05 allows users to 
write a single output (either ON or OFF) to the coil of a remote PLC device. The input 
data value defined using the DATA field, depicted in Figure 33, accepts the value 
0xFF00 for the output to be ON and the value 0x0000 for the output to be OFF. All other 
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input values are invalid and will not affect the output. The DATA_ADDRESS field 
identifies the address of the coil to be forced [8].  
d. Function Code 0x06 (Write Single Register) 
A successful execution of modbusclient using Function Code 0x06 allows users to 
write to a single holding register in a remote PLC device. The DATA_ADDRESS field, 
depicted in Figure 25, identifies the register address to be written (0x0000 to 0xFFFF). A 
successful execution of this request echoes the value of the defined DATA field [8].  
e. Observations 
We ran the Metasploit module, with the target address set to the PLC’s IP address, 
192.168.1.1. Other options for the module, depicted in Figure 33, include: target port 
(default Modbus port: 502), Modbus Unit ID (default: 1), Modbus data address, and data 
(applicable only to Function Codes 0x05 and 0x06 for writing data to the PLC).  
 
Figure 33.  modbusclient Metasploit module options 
The options menu provides no documented option for changing the Function 
Codes. We ran the scan setting RHOST to the Wago PLC’s IP address (192.168.1.1), 
DATA_ADDRESS to 0x00, and used the default for other parameters. The default 
Function Code is 0x03 (Read Holding Register). We referred to the Modbus 
Communication Between Wago Ethernet Couplers and Controllers manual to select the 
data address values used in the test [38]. Table 4 describes the different Modbus memory 
areas that are read by Function Code 0x03. 
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Table 4.   Wago 750-841: Modbus addresses for Function Code 0x03, 
from [38]  
 
 
We sampled memory addresses from the physical output area, configuration 
register, and retain memory area. Figure 34 illustrates sample command execution of the 
modbusclient module. By changing the DATA_ADDRESS field to a corresponding data 
address in the table, we were able to successfully read data stored in the PLCs memory. 
Data address 512 returned a value for the physical output area, data address 12288 
returned a value for the retain memory area, and data address 4096 returned a value 100 
the configuration register. Configuration registers allow properties of Wago 750-841 to 
be read and, in some cases, modified. The configuration register at data address 4096 
corresponds to the Modbus Watchdog Time (multiple of 100ms). Watchdog is a 
heartbeat-like sensor that monitors the execution time of tasks [39]. This indicates that 




Figure 34.  modbusclient  sample command execution 
After further experimentation with changing various values to the modbusclient 
module options, we found that the Function Code cannot be changed to the other three 




Figure 35.  modbusclient.rb Metasploit module code 
After further analysis of the source code, we discovered the procedures for 
changing the default function code. Switching the default function code to the other three 
options was accomplished by setting Boolean values to their variables (see Figure 36). 
The author of modbusclient did not provide adequate direction in regards to switching 
Function Codes to fully use the tool’s advertised functionality. There are several 
applications for this tool, if it worked as advertised. In addition to its capability to read 
coil and register information, it also has the capability to modify data on the PLC by 
writing on the coil and register. This module has sizeable potential to damage and/or 
control what PLCs running the Modbus/TCP can execute. 
 
Figure 36.  modbusclient switch default function code 
3. modbusdetect 
The modbusdetect Metasploit module detects Modbus service in a specified IP 
address range, for scanning and identifying targets running the Modbus/TCP protocol. 




on port 502 and waiting for a response that includes the same Transaction ID and 
Protocol ID. The module returns the Modbus/TCP header and the Unit ID of the PLC 
[40]. 
We ran the Metasploit module, with a target address range that includes the PLC’s 
IP address, i.e., 192.168.1.0/24. Other options for the module, depicted in Figure 37, 
include: target port (default Modbus port: 502), the number of concurrent threads, 
timeout for the network probe, and the Modbus Unit ID. 
 
Figure 37.  modbusdetect Metasploit module options 
The scan successfully detected the PLC at 192.168.1.1. The response indicated it 
received a correct Modbus/TCP header (Unit ID: 1), illustrated in Figure 38. From our 
tests with the modbus_findunitid module, the PLC responds to queries for Unit IDs 1 to 
246. As the modbusdetect module is designed to only probe using one Unit ID, the 
discovery of the PLC is unsurprising. The module does not have the option to probe an 
address range in aggressive mode using alternative Unit IDs.  
 
Figure 38.  modbusdetect Metasploit module results 
4. Enabling Tofino Security Appliance 
We reconfigured the Tofino Security Appliance to operational mode and 
observed how the tools behaved with the firewall in place. We repeated the test on 
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modbus_findunitid, modbusclient, and modbusdetect and observed the interaction 
between the Kali Linux and the PLC with the Tofino Security Appliance in operational 
mode. The firewall blocked the packets to the PLC until the tool timed out. Tofino 
Security Appliance’s default firewall rules did not allow Modbus/TCP packets not 
originating from the HMI or the CMP’s IP address to communicate with the PLC. 
D. PLCSCAN 
PLCScan is another scanning tool we evaluated in our test environment. PLCScan 
is a Python tool designed to scan and enumerate PLC devices operating on Modbus/TCP 
protocol and the Siemens Simatic S7 communication protocol. Dmitry Efanov, a member 
of the SCADA STRANGE LOVE GROUP, developed PLCScan. The tool package 
contains the plcscan.py and support files modbus.py and s7.py; the tool’s source code is 
available from its Google Code repository [41]. The command in Figure 39 can be used 
to download each of these files.  
 
Figure 39.  plcscan.py, modbus.py, and s7.py wget command 
1. Modbus/TCP 
PLCScan is comprised of several scanning and enumerating features for PLCs 
supporting Modbus/TCP. For a positive scan, the tool outputs the device’s IP address and 
port number, Unit ID, device name, and (if available) hardware and firmware data. It 
requires an IP range input for the target PLC device(s). Notable options include the 
following: brute-uid, modbus-uid, modbus-function, and modbus-data (see Figure 40) 
Each of these explained next.  
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Figure 40.  PLCScan options 
a. --brute-uid 
The brute-uid options provides the functionality to continue iterating through Unit 
ID 1 to 255 after initial discovery of the PLC in a specific IP address. This feature is 
beneficial when scanning and enumerating networks that contain PLCs connected to 
gateways. Brute forcing a gateway IP address will return all PLC Unit ID’s connected to 
that gateway. If the brute-uid option is not selected, the tool will return only the first 
discovered Unit ID from a specific IP address.  
b. --modbus-uid 
The modbus-uid option provides the user the option to select a specific Unit ID to 
use during the scan. This option is useful in instances where a user is searching for a 
specific PLC in a network that contains numerous PLCs. The scan result will be limited 
at the Unit ID and reduces clutter from other PLCs on the list.  
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c. --modbus-function 
The modbus-function option provides users the option to select a specific 
Function Code to use during the scan. This function is beneficial when scanning targets 
with unknown PLC hardware. Some PLC manufacturers only support a limited number 
of Function Codes. In the case of the Wago PLC 750-841, its Function Codes are limited 
to the following: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 15, 16, 22, and 23. PLCs that are discoverable using 
one type of Function Code may not be discoverable when using another type of Function 
Code. Manually iterating through a variety of Function Codes may increase the number 
of devices discovered in a network with different types of PLCs.  
d. --modbus-data 
The modbus-data option provides users the option to send custom data to the 
PLC. This is useful in conjunction with the modbus-function option. Various Function 
Codes require specific types of data as an input to the PLC for the command to work 
successfully. The flexibility of the user to add custom data to the command allows for 
fine-tuned targeting of specific PLCs.  
2. Siemens S7 
The Siemens S7 Communications Protocol is a protocol that PLCScan supports in 
addition to the Modbus/TCP protocol. We did not test and evaluate this feature of 
PLCScan since the Wago PLCs in our test environment only support the Modbus/TCP 
protocol.  Similar to scanning Modbus/TCP, the Siemens S7 scanner outputs the IP 
address and port number (102) for any PLC detected to support this protocol. As 
illustrated in Figure 41, other information that may be enumerated from a PLC device 
includes: module name, hardware and firmware versions, PLC name, plant identification, 




Figure 41.  PLCScan sample output for Siemens S7 protocol, from [42] 
3. Results and Observation 
We executed the PLCScan tool to scan and enumerate the Wago PLC on the test 
network using a variety of different options. The default Function Code of the PLCScan 
is Function Code 43 (Encapsulated Interface Transport). It sends out Function Code 43 
(Encapsulated Interface Transport) with the following request code: \x0E\x01\00 (see 
Figure 43). The first byte in the request, 0x0E, indicates the Modbus Encapsulated 
Interface (MEI) used by MEI Transport implementations to dispatch a method invocation 
to the indicated interface [8]. The second byte in the request (0x01–0x04) indicates the 
Read Device ID code; 0x01 is the code to get basic device identification [8]. The last byte 
in the request (0x00–0xFF) indicates the Object ID, or the type of object to which the 
MEI request pertains; object 0x00 is the Vendor Name [8]. 
Unfortunately, the Wago PLC does not support function code 43 (Encapsulated 
Interface Transport) [39]. Plcscan.py does not explicitly indicate that it uses function 
code 43 in addition to any function code specified by the user. As evident in Figures 42 
and 43, the “Device Info” section of the output indicates “Device info error: Illegal 
Function” when plcscan.py is executed using function code 6. 
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Figure 42.  PLCScan command using Function Code 6 
Figure 43 shows the PLCScan request containing Function Code 43. Figure 44 
shows the response from the Wago PLC returning an “Illegal Function” exception code. 
 
Figure 43.  WireShark packet capture—PLCScan request using Function Code 43 
 
Figure 44.  WireShark packet capture—Wago PLC “Illegal Function” exception 
code response  
Although the Wago PLC does not support Function Code 43, the user-defined  --
modbus-function option allows users to use other Function Codes in conjunction with the 
hard-coded, mandatory Function Code 43 tool feature. With knowledge of various 
Function Code request and response structure and functionality, users can elicit a correct 
response from a PLC device. By executing the command depicted in Figure 42 above, 
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inputting “2020” data using Function Code 0x06 (Write Single Register) returns a 
positive response from the PLC device. The --modbus-function option is independent of 
the hard-coded Function Code 43.  
A positive response from a PLC that supports the device information request via 
Function Code 43 is depicted in Figure 45, taken from a screen capture from a YouTube 
presentation by the PLCScan developers.  
 
Figure 45.  PLCScan sample output for Modbus/TCP protocol, from [42] 
E. WAGO PLC EXPLOIT 
Digital Bond’s Project Basecamp produced three tools that exploit CoDeSys 
vulnerabilities. CoDeSys is a development system, produced by 3S Software Gmbh, to 
program and execute logic on PLCs, motorized drive controllers, and other industrial 
controllers. CoDeSys supports ladder logic and other programming languages defined by 
the international industrial standard IEC 61131-3. Over 500 unique devices by over 163 
device manufacturers use CoDeSys worldwide [43], [44]. The 3S CoDeSys Runtime 
application is used by vendors to run ladder logic on their PLCs. Reid Wightman of 
Digital Bond have identified an improper access control and directory traversal 
vulnerability in the 3S CoDeSys Runtime application [43], [45]. These vulnerabilities 
allow for unauthorized access to the system and file system [45]. This allows users to 
connect to the CLI and execute commands including start and stop ladder logic, erase 
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PLC memory, list files and directories. Users also have the ability to transfer files to and 
from the PLC running the 3S CoDeSys Runtime application with the possibility of 
directory traversal where users can send and receive files outside of the 3S CoDeSys file 
system and into the critical system configuration such as /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd on 
Linux and Windows Registry on Windows CE [43]. 
The following are details about the three tools Digital Bond created to exploit and 
interact with PLCs running the CoDeSys runtime: 
1. CoDeSys-Shell.py 
This tool is a command-shell utility in the form of Python script. The script allows 
unauthenticated users to access the system and perform privileged operations without 
providing credentials. The tool bypasses vendor checks normally performed by the 3S 
CoDeSys software.  
The command depicted in Figure 46 downloads the CoDeSys-Shell.py code from 
Digital Bond’s website. The --no-check-certificate option is required to bypass the SSL 
authentication.  
 
Figure 46.  CoDeSys-Shell.py wget command 
The CoDeSys-Shell.py command requires a host IP address and TCP port as an 
input, depicted in Figure 47. A common CoDeSys service port is TCP/1200; some ports 
observed on other controller types are TCP/1201 and TCP/2455 [43]. The Wago PLC in 
our test environment runs CoDeSys services on TCP/2455. 
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Figure 47.  CoDeSys-Transfer.py and CoDeSys-Shell.py command options 
By entering a target PLC’s IP address and TCP port, the tool obtains 
unauthenticated access to the CoDeSys Runtime application in a form of a command-
shell utility. Entering “?” lists all available commands that can be executed in the 
command shell (Figure 48). The list of available commands varies by PLC hardware 
[43]. Some of the exploitable commands in the Wago 750-841 PLC used in our tests 
include memory dumps, getting table, ID, and task list information. Some of the more 
dangerous commands that a user with this privileged access can execute include stopping 
and resetting PLC program, deleting and extracting files, deleting passwords, and listing 
directories for directory traversal that may lead to more adverse actions against the PLC. 
We did not exercise these dangerous commands. 
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Figure 48.  CoDeSys-Shell command-shell utility options 
The getprgprop command (see Figure 49) returns the PLC’s program name, title, 
version number, author, and the date it was last updated. This information can be useful 
in an adversary’s initial scanning and enumeration of the network infrastructure.  
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Figure 49.  CoDeSys-Shell.py getprgprop command 
Similar to getprgprop command, the pinf and pid commands (see Figure 50) 
return the PLC’s project identification and similar information that is returned by 
getprgprop in addition to the project description. 
 
Figure 50.  CoDeSys-Shell.py pid and pinf command 
The tsk command (see Figure 51) returns crucial information about the task(s) that 
the PLC is running. This information includes the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 60870 task list and task information.  
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Figure 51.  CoDeSys-Shell.py tsk command 
The mem, memc, and memd commands (see Figure 52) return memory dump 
information and memory dump information relative to code start address and data start 
address. 
 
Figure 52.  CoDeSys-Shell.py mem memc, and memd commands 
The io command (see Figure 53) returns critical information that can be accessed 
by having privileged access to the 3S CoDeSys Runtime application. It lists all 
information about the plugged terminals.  
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Figure 53.  CoDeSys-Shell.py io command 
A potentially dangerous command that the 3S CoDeSys Runtime application has 
privileged access to is the filedir command (see Figure 54). It is used to list directories in 
the file system. When used with the filecopy, filerename, and filedelete commands, a user 
has the capability to move, copy, and delete files in the file system, causing potentially 
grave damage not only to the PLC and the system it is controlling but possibly second 
and third order reactions to the entire control system network. Another feature that is 
available in some devices is the possibility of directory traversal outside of the 3S 
CoDeSys Runtime application by executing the “../../” command in conjunction with the 
filedir command. 
 
Figure 54.  CoDeSys-Shell.py filedir command 
2. CoDeSys-Transfer.py 
The second tool that Digital Bond produced to exploit this 3S CoDeSys Runtime 
application software vulnerability is the CoDeSys-Transfer.py Python script. It is a file 
transfer tool that allows reading and writing files on controllers with a file system [43]. 
Similar to the CoDeSys-Shell.py Python script, it also bypasses vendor-specific 
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authentication checks allowing users to connect to the PLC without credentials. It 
exploits the same vulnerability as the CoDeSys-Shell.py script.  
The command depicted in Figure 55 downloads the CoDeSys-Transfer.py code 
from Digital Bond’s website. The --no-check-certificate option is required to bypass the 
SSL authentication.  
 
Figure 55.  CoDeSys-Transfer.py wget command 
The CoDeSys-Transfer.py command requires a host IP address, TCP port, local 
filename, and remote filename as an input, depicted in Figure 47 and Figure 56. Again, 
the Wago PLC in our test environment runs its services on TCP/2455. 
 
Figure 56.  CoDeSys-Transfer.py execute command 
Figure 57 illustrates an example of running the CoDeSys-Transferl.py command 
transferring the DEFAULT.PRG file from the PLC file system to a file called 
DEFAULT.PRG on the user’s machine. This command can also be reversed to write or 
overwrite commands into the PLC file system. This vulnerability makes complete 
reprogramming of PLC possible, which may gravely damage an entire industrial control 
network operations.  
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Figure 57.  CoDeSys-Transfer.py command result 
3. CoDeSys.nse 
The third tool that Digital Bond produced to exploit the 3S CoDeSys software is 
the CoDeSys.nse. This tool is an nmap script used to enhance the scanning tool by 
detecting whether a PLC or a controller is running a vulnerable version of the 3S 
CoDeSys software [43]. Below is a comparison between running the nmap scanning tool 
with and without the CoDeSys.nse script. Figure 58 illustrates the nmap executed without 
the CoDeSys.nse script and Figure 59 illustrates the nmap executed with the CoDeSys.nse 
script as an option. Running the CoDeSys.nse options provides additional information 
about the vulnerable version of the 3S CoDeSys software; “220 Nucleus FTP Server 
(Version 1.7) ready” indicates that at IP address 192.168.1.1 there is a vulnerable version 
of the 3S CoDeSys software through the FTP server TCP/21.  
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Figure 58.  nmap scan result without codesys.nse script 
 
Figure 59.  nmap scan result with codesys.nse script 
F. MODSCAN 
ModScan is a scanning tool developed by Mark Bristow that specifically looks for 
ICS-related control devices running the Modbus/TCP protocol. Given a specified IP 
address range, the tool seeks PLCs running the ModBus/TCP protocol by searching for 
ModBus device Unit ID. ModScan finds PLC device Unit IDs by sending out a Modbus 
packet in TCP/502 using various Function Codes. Mark Bristow presented this tool at 
DEF CON 16 in August 2008 and the presentation is available on YouTube [46]. The 
tool operates in several steps: first, it searches the IP address range provided for an open 
Modbus/TCP port (TCP/502). When an open port is found, it searches for the PLC Unit 
ID via brute force. As a default, the program terminates after the first discovered Unit ID 
is found [47]. 
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The ModScan source code is available in the Google Code repository [48]. The 
command depicted in Figure 60 downloads the modscan.py code from its website.  
 
Figure 60.  modscan wget command 
The ModScan tool contains a wide array of options for tailoring each scan to 
specific IP address range, port, and Function Codes (see Figure 61). The IP address range 
input can be configured using the standard IP address CIDR notation. The default port 
address is TCP/502. The default Function Code is 17 (0x11), which is Report Slave ID 
[8]. 
 
Figure 61.  modscan  list of options 
We ran the ModScan tool using the Wago PLCs IP address as the target IP and 
left all default options listed in Figure 61 unchanged. Figure 62 below illustrates what the 
tool returned after executing the command. The tool did not return any positive scan 
result from the PLC on the 192.68.1.1 IP address. Upon further investigation, we 
discovered the Wago 750-841 PLC does not support Function Code 0x11 (Report Slave 
ID) [39]. Individual packet analysis of the response from the Modbus server (PLC) 
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indicates that the server responds with an “Illegal Function Code” Error Code, 
confirming that the Wago 750-841 PLC does not support Function Code 0x11, which is 
the default Function Code for the ModScan tool. 
 
Figure 62.  modscan command using default Function Code 17 
We used the “-f’” option of ModScan to change the Function Code. Changing the 
Function Code requires modifying the data field by using the “--data” option on most 
Function Codes because the hard-coded data field in the ModScan tool is tailored for 
Function Code 0x11. Using Function Code 0x01 (Read Coils), we modified the data field 
with “\x00\x00\00\x08” (see Figure 63). We used the data from Mark Bristow’s DEF 
CON 16 talk as a guide to building a data input that returns a scan on the PLC [46].  The 
output format is “IP address : Port number \ Unit ID.” 
 
Figure 63.  modscan command using Function Code 0x01 (Read Coils) 
Another useful option ModScan has is the “--aggressive” option. Similar to 
PLCScan’s “--brute-uid” option, the aggressive option continues to scan a target IP 
address, iterating through all possible Unit IDs, after it finds an initial Unit ID. This 
feature is especially beneficial when targeting the IP addresses of gateways that are 
connected to multiple PLCs. When the ModScan tool is executed with the “--aggressive” 
option, the Wago 750-841 PLC returns Unit IDs 1 through 246 (see Figure 64). It is not 
specified in the Wago 750-841 manual whether this is the default setting [39]. It is 
uncertain whether this is set as part of Tofino SCADA Simulator default parameters.  
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Figure 64.  modscan command using Function Code 0x01 (Read Coils) in 
aggressive mode 
Figure 65 lists some of the Function Codes that are supported by the Wago 750-
841 PLC as specified in the manual [39].  Function Codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 15, 16, 22, 
and 23 are supported [39]. We tested all supported Function Codes and were successful 
in receiving positive scan results for all supported Function Codes. Each Function Code 
requires varying data inputs for the ModScan tool to do a successful scan. Using the 
ModScan tool requires a basic understanding of what each Function Code does and the 
types of information in each Function Codes data field. 
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VI. MOKI LINUX DISTRIBUTION 
In this chapter, we motivate the construction of a new, custom Linux distribution 
tailored for ICS penetration testing and defense, called Moki Linux. As our survey has 
shown, there is no tools distribution subsuming all existing ICS-related tools. Rather, 
existing distributions are maintained for special-purpose training and only carry a subset 
of the available tools. Further, lack of documentation and lack of support motivates 
developing some distribution with a demonstrably correct configuration for these tools, 
giving confidence to users that they are working as expected.  
In our survey, we observed that many tools are available from code repositories 
scattered across the Internet, such as various GitHub and Google Code repositories. 
Despite the wealth of tools available aggregated by Digital Bond, there is no single 
distribution, website or repository through which all of these resources are available. 
Further, we discovered many tools are poorly documented, are non-trivial to install or 
configure, and lack basic methods to demonstrate their correct functionality. It may 
appear to users that tools are not behaving properly, due to simple misconfiguration or a 
broken install process. Conversely, it may appear to users that tools are functioning 
correctly, when in fact the error messages are misleading and non-trivial test cases to 
demonstrate the actual logic are inaccessible. For example, in the case of the Modbus 
Metasploit module, modbusclient, there was no documentation describing how to change 
the default Modbus function code. As another example, the PLCScan tool uses function 
code 43 to request the PLC output device information by default. For PLCs that do not 
support this feature—like the Wago 750-841 PLC used in our test environment—the 
output message (“Device info error: ILLEGAL FUNCTION”) appears to users like an 
error. 
In this work, we have begun the task of developing a customized Kali distribution 
designed for research in ICS security, to include all available ICS tools. The Moki Linux 
distribution builds on the Kali Linux distribution. We selected Kali due to its popularity 
as a platform for penetration testing. A future goal is for Moki to be used either as an 
enhancement to Kali (for penetration testing tools for ICS) or to Security Onion (with 
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defensive tools tailored for the ICS domain), depending on the needs of the end-user. 
Currently, Moki distribution install scripts are available from GitHub [49]. The Moki 
scripts support installing all the tools evaluated in this thesis (i.e., Quickdraw, PLCScan, 
CoDeSys runtime shell exploit, ModScan). Options are available to install Snort with 
Digital Bond’s Quickdraw IDS rules, with logic to amend the existing Snort 
configuration and test the installation with sample traffic. The goal of the Moki 
distribution is to help new users overcome many of the difficulties we encountered in 
evaluating these tools. We are optimistic that others working in this domain may see 





The growing importance of Industrial Control Systems in today’s increasingly 
interconnected systems warrants their study. Securing these systems is vital to our 
national security, in light of the grave consequences where our nation’s critical 
infrastructure is disrupted or otherwise impacted by cyber attack. The lack of a 
centralized repository of tools to experiment with ICS systems from a cyber-security 
perspective makes this task difficult.  
A. SUMMARY 
In this work, we have surveyed publicly available defensive and adversarial ICS-
related tools. We found two primary penetration testing tools distributions (INL’s Kali 
Linux and SamuraiSTFU) developed primarily for ICS-related training courses. We 
highlighted many tools—found in neither distribution—that are publically available from 
repositories and research firms, such as Digital Bond. We conducted hands-on evaluation 
of select tools to verify their availability and to understand their operating state, including 
whether each works as described and has appropriate documentation to guide installation 
and use. We discovered that many tools are poorly documented, with features and 
functionality inaccessible without prior technical knowledge of various protocols and in-
depth analysis of the source code. 
The result of our survey and evaluation culminates in a proposed distribution for 
these tools. Moki Linux is an ICS-centric version of Kali Linux tailored with defensive 
and adversarial tools for security researchers in the ICS domain. Our first release of Moki 
Linux establishes a foundation on which other developers can build, to demonstrate how 
to install and configure their tools. Moki Linux is released as an open source custom 
Linux distribution, via GitHub, with the intention that it may evolve and incorporate new 
tools, as they are developed. 
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research topics related to our study include the continued hands-on 
evaluation of defensive and adversarial ICS tools, the documentation of ICS-related tools, 
and the expansion of the Moki Linux distribution. 
Our survey was limited to ICS-related tools available as of September 2014. 
Technology advances and new research continuously change the state of ICS 
vulnerabilities known today, and thus inspire new tools and techniques to exploit and 
defend against them. Our survey of defensive and adversarial ICS-related tools may need 
to be expanded and re-evaluated as the state of research progresses. Furthermore, in this 
work, we evaluated only a small number of the available tools for this domain. Hands-on 
experimentation with existing tools may help the ICS community understand which tools 
need better documentation, which tools cease to be demonstrably useful and which tools 
require updates. Finally, tools that no longer work “as advertised” may warrant being 
improved or fixed.  
We intend that developers expand the Moki Linux distribution to support all tools 
that may be useful for security research in the ICS domain. As such, expansion of Moki is 
crucial to keep pace with development of new tools and exploits. Demonstrating how to 
install and use tools by incorporating them into the Moki distribution will be beneficial to 
the ICS community and is worthy of future research, broadening the set of resources 
available to ICS security professionals.  
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